KEEPING HELLER OUT OF THE HOME: HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
*

Christopher J. Wahl

The homeowners association (“HOA”) of Nashboro Village in Nashville,
Tennessee, adopted a rule in 2007 prohibiting the possession of guns in the
1
neighborhood’s homes. The rule was passed in response to an increase of
crime in the area, but residents responded furiously, claiming in the local
2
media that the rule was unconstitutional and a threat to their safety. The
HOA retracted by saying that it would change the rule, apparently before
3
any legal challenge was undertaken, but it is telling that, even before the
Supreme Court ruled in 2008 in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second
Amendment protected the individual right to keep a handgun for defense of
4
the home, homeowners believed that this right was entitled to
constitutional protection.
5
The legality of an HOA ban on handguns remains an unsettled
6
question. No litigation on the issue has surfaced in the courts. One
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Managing Editor of Heightened Scrutiny, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional
Law, Volume 15. J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2009,
University of Florida. I would like to thank Professor Sophia Z. Lee for her mentorship
and guidance, Professor Louis S. Rulli for his helpful suggestions, and Professor Sarah
Barringer Gordon for inspiring my interest in property law.
See Community Suggests Gun Possession Is Illegal For Residents, NEWSCHANNEL5, Mar. 18, 2007,
http://www.newschannel5.com/story/6242822/community-suggests-gun-possession-isillegal-for-residents? (for date of publication, see http://forums.officer.com/forums/
archive/index.php/t-63481.html).
See id.
See id. The author’s research did not uncover any indication that legal action was
undertaken with regard to this controversy.
554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008).
For evidence of the existence of HOA gun prohibitions, see Community Suggests Gun
Possession Is Illegal For Residents, supra note 1; New Bills Introduced in 2012, ARIZ. CITIZENS
DEF. LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP NEWSL., Feb. 2012, at 1 available at http://
www.azcdl.org/AzCDL201202b.pdf (“Still embedded in many governing documents are
requirements that residents must be unarmed as a condition of living in the
community.”); SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS IN FORTRESS AMERICA 162 (2003) (identifying a firearm prohibition in Bear
Creek, an HOA in Washington state); Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private
Communities, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 526 (2009) (“[M]ost HOAs reportedly hold
restrictions against firearms in homes . . . .” (citing LOW, supra)).
The author’s research did not uncover any court documents related to the issue. It would
be interesting to know to what extent the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) and other
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academic commentator has argued, before Heller appeared on the horizon,
that HOA servitudes banning firearm possession in the home are both
7
invalid under property law and unconstitutional. Yet for the most part this
8
topic has been ignored in academic discussion. Professor Paul Boudreaux
briefly conceded that an HOA handgun ban would likely be valid, but he
argued that legislation should protect the right to bear arms against
9
infringement by HOAs. Representatives in the Arizona state legislature
have taken this approach by introducing a controversial bill that would
prohibit HOAs from banning handgun possession anywhere in an HOA10
governed community except for the HOA management office.
This Comment accelerates the discussion of HOA handgun bans by
assessing the constitutional and property law arguments relevant to a legal
determination of the validity of an HOA handgun ban. Part I of the
Comment provides a brief historical overview of the HOA as a modern
phenomenon of property law. This Part also explains the legal standards
governing HOAs by addressing the constitutional problem of state action as

7
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9
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interest groups have used their political influence to thwart HOA attempts to restrict the
right to bear arms. In one instance in which an HOA in California passed a rule banning
the discharge of firearms within its equestrian community, the NRA and its lawyers
persuaded the HOA board to rescind the rule. See NRA Helps California Homeowners
Convince HOA to Drop Gun Ban Plan, AMMOLAND (Mar. 3, 2011), http://
www.ammoland.com/2011/03/03/nra-helps-california-homeowners-convince-hoa-todrop-gun-ban-plan. Although in that instance opponents to the rule argued that the rule
was invalid in part because the HOA board failed to observe proper procedure in
enacting the rule, see id., a legal challenge to the rule most likely would have raised the
question of the right to bear arms.
See John-Patrick Fritz, Comment, Check Your Rights and Your Guns at the Door: Questioning
the Validity of Restrictive Covenants Against the Right to Bear Arms, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 551, 576
(2007) (“[C]ourts should invalidate restrictive covenants that completely ban firearms in
the home as violating constitutional rights and good public policy.”).
For one off-handed reference, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United,
McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 954
(2011) (citing Fritz, supra note 7) (“A home buyer who covenants not to possess firearms
is a respectful neighbor; a village of private covenants not to possess firearms is a zoning
regulation.”).
See Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 526 (arguing that the right to bear firearms is a “relatively
strong candidate for inclusion in an HOA resident bill of rights”). See also Fritz, supra
note 7, at 576 (“[S]tate legislatures should enact laws to statutorily safeguard this right.”).
H.B. 2095, 15th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012). See New Bills Introduced in 2012, supra
note 5, at 1 (“HB 2095 was drafted to allow the residents of HOA governed communities
the same constitutionally protected right to bear arms they enjoy once they leave the
boundaries of their neighborhood.”). But see HOA Admin, Arizona HOA Industry Upset
About
HB2095,
SPECTRUM
ASS’N
MGMT.
(Jan.
16,
2012),
http://www.spectrumam.com/blog/2012/01/16/arizona-hoa-industry-upset-abouthb2095/ (“If a guest of a resident of a community wants to bring a gun to the playground
in a planned community HB2095 would block the neighborhood from having any policy
against it. It’s pure insanity.”). This Comment does not address the question of whether
such legislation is valid.
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well as the common law test for validity of an HOA servitude. Part II
examines the right to keep and bear arms at both the federal and state levels
to orient the reader to the constitutional policy issues implicated by an HOA
servitude that bans handgun possession in the home. The constitutional
and common law arguments both for and against HOA prohibitions on
handguns are presented in Part III. In Part IV, this Comment concludes
that the post-Heller HOA landscape will be characterized by a patchwork
approach to the validity of HOA handgun bans.

I. HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
A. Historical Development of the Homeowners Association
Before the Industrial Revolution, the detached, single-family residence
owned in fee simple absolute was the chief residential property arrangement
11
in the Anglo-American tradition.
Eschewing private contractual
restrictions, homeowners exercised their property rights freely, subject only
to the law of nuisance and to the occasional land-use regulation imposed by
12
a city government. Even real estate developers took a hands-off approach
13
to selling property by imposing few, if any, restrictions on land use.
The character of the privately owned residence transformed when more
heavily populated and polluted cityscapes developed in the wake of the
Industrial Revolution. Zoning laws restructured the contours of cities and
gave some relief to private homeowners, but the more intricate facets of
14
residential neighborhoods remained untouched by government action.
The land-use covenant thus proved to be the solution for homeowners who
sought to exercise control of their surroundings: this form of contractual
agreement contained in residential deeds bound homeowners to use, or not
15
to use, their property in accordance with terms set forth in the agreement.
Because these covenants were binding on future purchasers and enforceable
by injunctive relief, the agreements gave homeowners assurance that their

11
12

13
14

15

See Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 483–84.
See id. This tradition is embodied by William Blackstone’s observation that “[e]very man’s
house is looked upon by the law to be his castle . . . .” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 288. For a list of sources describing the role of the home in the
development of the Anglo-American legal system, see Thomas G. Sprankling, Note, Does
Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of the Third Amendment’s Protection of
Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 113 n.12 (2012).
See Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 483 & n.17.
See id. at 485 (citing the precedent-setting case recognizing zoning as a constitutional use
of the state-government police power, Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926)).
See id. at 484.
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This
residential environs would not change without their consent.
assurance, in turn, increased property values while inducing other
homeowners to join in the covenants, thereby establishing more stable and
17
aesthetically pleasing (or racially homogenous) neighborhoods.
Real
estate developers, at least initially, were restrained from capitalizing on this
legal innovation because of the requirement that the enforcer of a covenant
18
contemporaneously be an owner of the property subject to the covenant.
Yet before long, developers began to establish HOAs, which were authorized
to enforce the agreements contained in the residential property deeds sold
by the developers, even after the original contracting homeowners sold their
19
homes to new homeowners.
By the late 1920s, subdivisions governed by HOAs were an established
luxury in the United States, and by the 1960s the market for HOA-governed
20
communities expanded to the middle class. Today, the HOA model for
residential community development has evolved into a variety of forms,
21
including planned-unit developments, condominiums, and cooperatives.
The number of individuals living in association-governed communities in
the United States has been rising since the 1970s, reaching an estimated 62.3
22
million individuals as of 2011.
Of these communities, about 52% are
23
planned unit developments, defined as “single-family detached homes built
24
according to a master plan, generally in the suburbs.” The popularity of
these communities today is due to their potential to improve residents’
quality of life by controlling the community environment and by providing
residents with easy access to amenities by spreading costs for the amenities
25
among all members of the HOA. An HOA maintains its ideal environment
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

See id. at 484–85 (citing the seminal case upholding land-use covenants, Tulk v. Moxhay,
(1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143).
See id.
See id. at 485.
See id. HOA-governed communities are also known as “common-interest communities.”
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6 (2000) [hereinafter RST
SERVITUDES].
See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 9–10 (1994).
See id. at 19.
Industry Data, CMTY ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
Id.
MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 19.
See RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, § 6, intro. note, at 68. The notoriety of these
communities, on the other hand, is reflected in criticisms that the communities cultivate
social and racial exclusivity, homogeneity, and paranoia. See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese,
Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise of Government for
“the Nice.” 37 URB. LAW. 335, 338 (2005) (“‘[N]iceness’ as a goal does not tend to inspire
great originality, depth or tolerance. Nor does it allow much room for heterogeneity of a
sort that might rock the ‘nice’ boat. The homogeneity (which some might cast as
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chiefly by enforcing the HOA’s rules, which can govern a wide range of
homeowner activity, including architectural and landscape design (from
house colors to mailbox sizes), use of common property, kinds of pets that
can be kept in homes, and number of guests that homeowners may
26
accommodate at any given time.
Three fundamental legal characteristics allow HOAs to achieve their
defining character: (1) common ownership of the “common area” property
(including streets, parks, and recreation centers);
(2) mandatory
membership in the HOA; and (3) the bundle of servitudes in the land
27
deeds. The HOAs are typically organized as non-profit corporations and
are established by the real estate developer of the community before any
28
homes are sold. A board of directors, elected by members of the HOA, is
primarily responsible for managing the community’s affairs and therefore is
vested with various powers, including the power to collect fees for upkeep of
the common area and the power to enforce the servitudes of the HOA by
29
exacting penalties or taking judicial action.
The success of HOAs in
achieving their desired goals is due in part to the rigidity of the rule system.
Directors are often restrained in their discretion to enforce the rules of the
30
HOA, since HOA members can bring suit against directors for inaction.
Accordingly, HOA rules are often enforced even when prudence would
31
dictate otherwise, and exceptions to the rules are rarely granted.

26

27

28
29
30
31

blandness) that common interest communities promote can reach beyond the merely
aesthetic into the realm of the patently exclusionary, as ‘the other,’ however defined,
finds itself shut out.” (footnote omitted)); Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the
“Secession of the Successful”: Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1675, 1679 (2001) (identifying “several theories as to how [common-interest
developments] attenuate the social contract: (1) they cultivate property owners rather
than citizens; (2) they harness economic and racial homogeneity; and (3) they
predominate in new, outer-ring suburban developments, thereby contributing to an
existing phenomenon of regional polarization”).
See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1384–
85 (1994) (surveying the various kinds of HOA covenants). Some HOA rules have
reached so far as to prohibit placing political signs in yards, parking trucks overnight in
driveways, piling up magazines in living rooms, wearing flip-flops, and kissing in the
condominium building’s elevator. See Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 492–93. For even
more examples of HOA restrictions, such as restrictions on “the propriety of wokcooking” and the prohibition of “cooking that could produce less than ‘desirable’
aromas,” see Franzese, supra note 25, at 336–37, 339–40.
See MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 19–20. These servitudes are also known as “covenants,
conditions, and restrictions,” or “CC&Rs.” See id. at 20. This Comment also refers to
these servitudes as “rules.”
See id. at 20.
See id. See also RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, § 6, intro. note, at 70.
See MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 21.
See id.
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Moreover, a change in the rules often requires supermajority consent of all
32
HOA members.
A homeowner who does not wish to comply with an HOA rule, such as a
restriction on handgun possession in the home, thus has few attractive
options: accede to the rule; violate the rule and suffer the consequences
(including accrued penalties for repeated violations); sell one’s home and
move away, thereby relinquishing membership in the HOA; or challenge the
rule in court, waging a costly legal battle against the highly deferential law of
33
servitudes.

B. Legal Standards Governing the Servitudes of Homeowners Associations
1. The State Action Problem
An HOA servitude that would ban handgun possession in the home
could implicate the constitutional right to bear arms, but the validity of a
constitutional claim against such a ban is delimited largely by the state
34
action doctrine. The Restatement recognizes that HOAs “are created by
private contract and [thus], absent other circumstances, the associations’
actions are not state action sufficient to subject them to challenge under the
35
United States Constitution . . . .”
These “other circumstances” that the
Restatement refers to are two Supreme Court decisions that, despite their
fame (or notoriety), are viewed by most authorities as outliers.
The first extraordinary circumstance in which state action could arise
36
from private legal affairs was established in the 1946 case Marsh v. Alabama.
32
33

34

35

36

See id.
For other accounts of the historical development of HOAs, see, for example, MCKENZIE,
supra note 20; Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 483–94; Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech
Allowed: Common Interest Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free
Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 233, 235–40 (2006); Brian Jason Fleming, Note,
Regulation of Political Signs in Private Homeowner Associations: A New Approach, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 571, 576–77 (2006).
This Comment will assume that the Second Amendment has a state action requirement.
See also Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36 n.185
(2012) [hereinafter Blocher, Right Not To] (“I am of course assuming that the Second
Amendment, like most constitutional guarantees, has a state action requirement.”).
RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, § 6, intro. note, at 70–71. Accord Reule v. Sherwood
Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. H-05-3197, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25597, at *14
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005), aff’d, 235 F. App’x 227 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff
failed to state a claim because none of the defendants is a state actor); Barr v. Camelot
Forest Conservation Ass’n, 153 F. App’x 860, 862 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that plantiff
must allege state action in order to make out a constitutional claim under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments); Rehfuss v. Northpoint Homeowner’s Ass’n, No. 93-15203,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14847, at *2 (9th Cir. June 15, 1993) (holding that no jurisdiction
exists because defendant is not a state actor).
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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In Marsh, the Court applied the constitutional standards of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the arrest and prosecution of a Jehovah’s
Witness who had, without permission, distributed religious literature in the
community shopping center of Chickasaw, a town in Alabama owned
37
entirely by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. The Court predicated its
recognition of state action on the finding that the operation of the
company-owned shopping center was “essentially a public function”: the
center was open to the public and was “built and operated primarily to
38
benefit the public.” Although the Court extended the reasoning of Marsh
to a privately owned shopping center not located in a company-owned town
39
in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., the
Court soon thereafter reined back its reach, overruling Logan Valley and
40
limiting Marsh to the particularities of the company-owned town.
The
Court made it clear that Marsh would apply only where “the owner of the
company town was performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and
41
stood in the shoes of the State.”
The other circumstance in which a court found state action in the
42
context of a private agreement arose in Shelley v. Kraemer, a case decided
two years after Marsh. In Shelley, the Court invalidated a racially restrictive
covenant as a violation of equal protection upon a finding that a court’s
enforcement of such a covenant is state action and thus subject to
43
constitutional restraint.
Although the reasoning of Shelley has been
44
extended beyond the context of racially discriminatory servitudes, most

37
38
39

40

41
42
43
44

Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 506.
391 U.S. 308, 317–21 (1968) (finding that a privately owned shopping center was the
“functional equivalent” of the business district in Marsh, and giving First Amendment
protection to protestors’ picketing).
See Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569–70 (1972) (rejecting the extension of
Marsh to a privately owned shopping center). See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
518 (1976) (“[W]e make clear now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan
Valley did not survive the Court’s decision in the Lloyd case.” (footnote omitted)).
Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 20–21.
See, e.g., Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884, 885–86 (M.D.
Fla. 1989) (invalidating a servitude that severely restricted display of the American flag
because First Amendment standards applied to the court’s state action of enforcing the
private agreement), vacated in part on other grounds, 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1339, 1341 (M.D.
Fla. 1991); W. Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969)
(refusing to enforce servitudes that prohibited property owners from constructing places
of worship because judicial enforcement of such servitudes would be state action in
violation of the First Amendment).
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courts and commentators have interpreted Shelley so narrowly as to render
45
the case an anomaly.
“In the absence of state action, there may be no constitutional
protection,” but in the rare case that the court finds state action in the
context of an HOA servitude, the question becomes a matter of
46
constitutional law. The viability of the state actor argument in the context
of an HOA ban on handgun possession will be explored further in Part
III.A.

2. The Common Law Presumption of Validity
Even absent state action, constitutional law may influence an HOA
servitude’s validity via the public policy exception to the common law
standard for validity of a servitude. Under this standard, servitudes are
subject to a presumption of validity but can be declared invalid under
particular circumstances. Various authorities articulate the test in slightly
differing ways. The Restatement further provides that a servitude is
considered “valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public
47
48
policy.” State courts recognize variations of this test. The Restatement
45

46
47

48

See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that
Shelley “has not been extended beyond the context of race discrimination” and that “the
concept of state action has since been narrowed by the Supreme Court”); In re Adoption
of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 751 (Ill. 2002) (refusing to find state action “on the mere fact
that a state court is the forum for the dispute”); Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer
Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 453, 458–70 (2007) (surveying the
post-Shelley case law and arguing that the vast majority of courts have not extended Shelley
beyond the context of racial discrimination, that the Supreme Court has even refused to
apply Shelley in the context of racial discrimination, and that those few decisions made on
the basis of Shelley can be “better explained by alternative rationales”). One commentator
has even deemed Shelley the Finnegans Wake of constitutional law. See Philip B. Kurland,
The Supreme Court 1963 Term, Foreward: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative
and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 148 (1964).
RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1 cmt. d.
Id. at § 3.1. An “illegal” servitude is defined as “one that is prohibited by a statute or
governmental regulation,” such as “[f]air housing acts and other anti-discrimination
statutes and ordinances.” Id. at § 3.1 cmt. c. This Comment will assume the absence of
any such law prohibiting HOA restrictions on handguns. There is, however, a bill
pending in the Arizona legislature that would make illegal almost all HOA restrictions on
handguns. See H.B. 2095, 15th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012), supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
Florida law provides that servitudes found in the HOA declaration are “clothed with a
very strong presumption of validity” and “will not be invalidated absent a showing that
they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of public policy, or that they
abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.” Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso,
393 So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Accord Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers
v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1075 (N.J. 2007); Noble v. Murphy, 612
N.E.2d 266, 270–71 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). The California test is remarkably similar: “An
equitable servitude will be enforced unless it violates public policy; it bears no rational
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provides that “a servitude that unreasonably burdens a fundamental
49
constitutional right” is one kind of servitude that violates public policy.
Invalidation of a servitude on these grounds is an invalidation distinct from
an invalidation made on the grounds that the servitude is unconstitutional.
In the latter case, the HOA necessarily would be subject to the state action
50
doctrine for constitutional standards to apply. In the former case, the state
actor doctrine would not be considered, and the servitude would be subject
to a public policy analysis, informed in part by the policy concerns evinced
51
by the appropriate constitutional provisions. The California courts also
take this approach: in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Association,
the California Supreme Court recognized that “a land-use restriction in
violation of a state constitutional provision presumably would conflict with
52
public policy.”
Although the plaintiff in that case claimed that the
servitude violated her right to privacy under the state constitution, the
Court, due to a lack of state action in the facts of the case, construed
plaintiff’s argument not as a constitutional claim, but rather “as a claim that
the [HOA] pet restriction violate[d] a fundamental public policy and for
53
that reason [could not] be enforced.” Other state courts are in accord with
54
this distinction.
The public policy analysis is based on a balancing of interests, and a
servitude will be held in violation of public policy if the “risks of societal
55
harm . . . outweigh the benefits of validating the servitude.” A court will
look to judicial decisions, legislation, and the federal or state constitution as

49
50
51
52
53
54

55

relationship to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose of the affected land; or
it otherwise imposes burdens on the affected land that are so disproportionate to the
restriction’s beneficial effects that the restriction should not be enforced.” Nahrstedt v.
Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1287 (Cal. 1994). Notably, the Florida courts
apply a different test if the HOA rule is not contained in the declaration of the HOA, but
rather is created solely by the board of directors of the HOA. In such an instance, the
rule enacted must be “reasonably related to the promotion of the health, happiness and
peace of mind of the unit owners.” Hidden Harbour, 393 So. at 640. The purpose of this
heightened standard is to “fetter the discretion of the board of directors.” Id. This
Comment will assume that HOA servitudes banning handgun possession in the home are
contained in the declaration of the HOA and thus subject to the lower standard of review.
RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1(2).
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. d. A servitude of an HOA that did not qualify as a state actor would
therefore not be subject to constitutional scrutiny.
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. h.
878 P.2d at 1290.
Id.
For example, if the language of the Florida case law is compared to that of California and
of the Restatement, then the Florida courts, in referring to servitudes that “abrogate some
fundamental constitutional right,” seem to be referring to unconstitutional servitudes as
distinct from servitudes in violation of a public policy evinced by a fundamental
constitutional right. See supra note 48.
RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1 cmt. h.
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56

sources of public policy. The court will balance interests as a matter of
property law, and not necessarily of the substantive law expressed within the
57
sources of public policy. For example, in determining whether a servitude
unreasonably burdens a fundamental constitutional right, “[c]onstitutional58
law decisions may be useful, but are not controlling.” Property law policies
typically considered when balancing interests include freedom of contract,
protection of expectation interests, and promotion of socially productive
59
uses of land.
The Restatement identifies various other factors relevant in a public
policy analysis when a servitude is alleged to pose an unreasonable burden
on a fundamental constitutional right.
These factors include the
60
geographical scope of the servitude; the extent to which the purpose of the
servitude is related to the use or value of the land; the extent to which the
servitude interferes with the exercise of the fundamental right, including the
existence of reasonable alternatives for exercising the right; and the
61
importance of the beneficiaries’ interest in validating the servitude.
Finally, if a servitude impinges an individual’s freedom to exercise his or her
fundamental rights on his or her individually owned property, then a court
will give considerably less deference to the servitude unless the targeted
activity produces negative externalities, or “spill-over effects,” upon the rest
62
of the community.
Given the variety of interests potentially implicated, and the sensitive
nature of the act of balancing such interests, the public policy test is
63
“necessarily imprecise.” While this imprecision may lead one to fear that a
56

57
58

59
60

61
62
63

See id. at § 3.1 cmt. f. See also, e.g., Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1291 (“[W]e discern no
fundamental public policy that would favor the keeping of pets in a condominium
project. There is no federal or state constitutional provision or any California statute that
confers a general right to [do so] . . . .”); Crane Neck Ass’n v. New York City/Long Island
Cnty. Servs. Grp., 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339–43 (N.Y. 1984) (relying upon a body of state
legislation to evince a public policy that warranted refusing to enforce a servitude that
prevented the establishment of a residence for mentally handicapped individuals).
RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1 cmt. h.
Id. The fact that certain rights are protected by a federal or state constitution against
governmental action “suggests that there is also a public interest in protecting them
against private action.” Id.
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i.
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. h. While a government’s power extends throughout the entirety of its
jurisdiction, the power of an HOA extends only throughout the properties that are part
of the HOA. Id. As such, an individual does not necessarily need to leave a jurisdiction to
avoid the unwanted influence of an HOA, but an individual must leave a jurisdiction to
avoid the power of that jurisdiction’s laws. Id. The broader the geographical scope
covered by a servitude, however, the more that a servitude’s intrusion upon an
individual’s autonomy approximates the intrusion imposed by a law. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i.
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court may have too much leeway, the fact that servitudes are protected with
a presumption of validity works against the potential bias or prejudice of a
64
court applying the flexible public policy test to a servitude.
An HOA servitude that bans handgun possession in the home would
thus be subject to a balancing test based on a state court’s interpretation of
the state’s public policy. Given that such a ban touches upon the right to
65
bear arms, a fundamental right under the United States Constitution, the
balancing of policies underlying the servitude would need to weigh in favor
of validity more strongly than would the policies underlying a servitude that
does not touch upon a fundamental right. The HOA handgun ban might
also be subject to constitutional scrutiny if the HOA were deemed to be a
state actor. Yet regardless of whether a court addresses a constitutional
claim or a property law claim against an HOA ban on handgun possession in
the home, the constitutional standards and policies underlying the right to
keep and bear arms will be relevant to the court’s analysis.

II. THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
A. Heller, McDonald, and the Second Amendment
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v.
66
67
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago have reinvigorated the Second
Amendment doctrine and inspired a new wave of Second Amendment

64

65
66
67

Public policy balancing tests are also employed in contexts outside of the law of
servitudes. A court may declare a contract term unenforceable as a violation of public
policy, notwithstanding the public interest in freedom of contract. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). There also is a public policy exception to the atwill employment doctrine: while generally employers are free to fire their employees for
any or no reason, a discharged employee can recover damages against his employer if the
employer’s reasons for discharging the employee violate public policy. See, e.g., Rothrock
v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., 883 A.2d 511, 515 (Pa. 2005) (“[I]f a violation of a clear
mandate of public policy results in the termination of an at-will employee, that employee
would have a right of action for wrongful discharge.”); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d
915, 918 (Va. 1987) (recognizing “an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
limited to discharges which violate public policy, that is, the policy underlying existing
laws designed to protect the property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare
of the people in general” (emphasis omitted)). See also Note, Protecting Employees At Will
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931 (1983)
(discussing the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine). This
Comment leaves open to question the validity of a contract term (but not a servitude)
that requires a party to the contract to waive his right to keep a handgun in the home, or
the validity of a claim that an employer’s discharge of an employee based on the fact that
the employee kept a handgun at home is a violation of public policy.
See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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litigation. On June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court struck down a District of
Columbia law that had effectively prohibited the possession of handguns in
68
residents’ homes. In so holding, the Court recognized for the first time in
69
over two hundred years that the Second Amendment codifies and protects
the individual “right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of
70
71
self-defense.” The Court’s originalist interpretation of the language of
the Amendment rejected the long-disputed notion that the Amendment
“protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with
72
militia service.” Instead, the Court’s interpretation focused on three core
components of the right to bear arms, as understood by the ratifiers of the
Second Amendment. First, the “defense of self, family, and property” is the
73
purpose of the right to bear arms. Second, the home is where the need for
74
this right is “most acute.”
Third, the handgun, out of all firearms, is
considered by the American people “to be the quintessential self-defense
68

69
70
71

72

73
74

Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75. The law, in relevant part, criminalized the carrying of
unregistered firearms; prohibited the registration of handguns; and required owners of
licensed firearms to keep the firearms nonfunctional when at home, “even when
necessary for self-defense.” Id. at 574–76.
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (summarizing the holding in Heller).
In interpreting the text, the Court was “guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their
normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’” Heller, 554 U.S. at 576
(quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). There is an ample body of
literature discussing the Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment in Heller. For
an extensive discussion of the role of originalism in Heller, see, for example, Lawrence B.
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 926 (2009)
(“[T]he Court embraced what has been called ‘original public meaning originalism’—
the view that the original meaning of a constitutional provision is the conventional
semantic meaning that the words and phrases had at the time the provision was framed
and ratified.”). The majority’s originalist interpretation in Heller has also been subject to
much criticism. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule
of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009) (criticizing Heller for “four major shortcomings: an
absence of a commitment to textualism; a willingness to embark on a complex endeavor
that will require fine-tuning over many years of litigation; a failure to respect legislative
judgments; and a rejection of the principles of federalism”); Saul Cornell, Originalism on
Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625,
626 (2008) (criticizing plain-meaning originalism in Heller as “little more than a lawyer’s
version of a magician’s parlor trick—admittedly clever, but without any intellectual heft”);
Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32
(criticizing the majority in Heller for having “exercise[d] a freewheeling discretion
strongly flavored with ideology,” since “the ‘originalist’ method would have yielded the
opposite result”).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. For a chronicle of the so-called “collectivist” interpretation of the
Second Amendment right, see David T. Hardy, The Rise and Demise of the “Collective Right”
Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315 (2011).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
Id.
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75

weapon.” Because the law being challenged essentially eradicated all core
aspects of the Second Amendment right, the Court held that the law
76
violated the Second Amendment.
Because the Court in Heller was faced with a law of the District of
Columbia, the Court did not reach the question of whether the Second
Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Two years later, however, the Court in McDonald held that the
Second Amendment applies with equal force against the state governments
77
as it does against the federal government. The Court therefore invalidated
a Chicago ordinance that “effectively bann[ed] handgun possession” in the
78
home. In finding that the right to keep and bear arms is “deeply rooted in
79
this Nation’s history and tradition” and “fundamental to our scheme of
80
ordered liberty,” and therefore incorporated against the states through the
81
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court declared
82
that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right.
Heller and McDonald were historical decisions, and their legal
83
ramifications are now playing out in the lower courts. For HOAs, Heller
and McDonald mean that, if an HOA imposing a handgun restriction is a
state actor, disaffected homeowners may bring a constitutional claim for
84
violation of the Second Amendment. Moreover, by virtue of the fact that
the Second Amendment right is now a fundamental right, an HOA servitude
that restricts the right triggers the elevated policy concerns of the test for
85
validity of HOA servitudes.
A court may look not only at Heller and
McDonald when conducting a public policy analysis, but also to the broader
contours of the Second Amendment currently manifesting in the lower
courts.

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

82

83
84
85

Id. at 629.
Id. at 635.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
Id. at 3026 (describing ordinances enacted by the City of Chicago and the nearby village
of Oak Park that are substantively similar to the D.C. law struck down in Heller).
Id. at 3036 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
This is the “process of ‘selective incorporation’” employed by the Supreme Court to
determine whether “the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained
in the first eight Amendments.” Id. at 3034.
Id. at 3042 (“[I]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to
our system of ordered liberty.”).
See infra Part II.B–C.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.2.
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B. The Post-Heller Second Amendment Doctrine in the Lower Federal Courts
As groundbreaking as the Heller and McDonald decisions were, the Court
left many questions unanswered. Among these are the role of categorical
exceptions, the means-end scrutiny to apply to challenged laws, and how the
answers to the former two questions will form a framework for addressing
Second Amendment claims. The lower federal courts have responded to
these questions with some converging results.
In Heller, the Court identified several categorical exceptions to the
Second Amendment—categories of laws upon which “nothing in [the]
86
opinion should be taken to cast doubt.” The first category consisted of laws
prohibiting certain individuals from possessing firearms: “felons and the
87
mentally ill.” The second category concerned laws prohibiting individuals
from carrying firearms in “sensitive places”: “schools and government
88
buildings.” The third category included laws that imposed “conditions and
89
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” The Court also identified a
protected category of laws that prohibit the carrying of “dangerous and
90
unusual weapons.” The Court further stated that their “list [of categorical
91
exceptions] does not purport to be exhaustive” and refused “to expound
92
upon the historical justifications for the exceptions.”
The Heller Court was guided by a means-end analysis. The Court did not
identify the precise form of the analysis, but it did set some boundaries. The
Court rejected rational basis review because the Second Amendment is a
93
“specific, enumerated right.”
The Court also rejected Justice Breyer’s
proposal for an “interest-balancing inquiry,” since there is “no other
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected
94
to [such an] approach.” What the Court did clarify is that the kind of law
challenged in both Heller and McDonald—one that infringes upon the core
of the Second Amendment right—is unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional
95
rights.”
Just as the Court refused to provide an explanation for the

86
87
88
89
90
91
92

93
94
95

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 627 n.26.
Id. at 635. The Court in McDonald approved of these categories, but again failed to
provide any guidance thereto. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047
(2010).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 628–29.
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categorical exceptions, the Court deferred establishing a particular level of
96
scrutiny for Second Amendment claims.
The lower federal courts have picked up on these stray threads and
weaved a Second Amendment doctrine that incorporates both the
categorical exceptions and the means-ends analysis identified by the
97
98
Supreme Court in Heller. In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit
articulated a two-step inquiry that already has been employed by the Third,
99
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. The threshold inquiry is
whether the activity regulated by the challenged law falls into the “scope” of
100
the Second Amendment right.
Consistent with the Court’s originalist
101
approach, the scope question demands “a textual and historical inquiry
into [the] original meaning” of the right as understood by the people at the
102
time of adoption of the relevant amendment.
Thus, if a federal law is
challenged, the court must look to the people’s understanding of the right
as of 1791, the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment; if a state or
local law is challenged, the court must look to the people’s understanding of
the Second Amendment right as of 1868, the time of adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment (through which the Second Amendment is
103
incorporated against the states). According to the Third Circuit, this first
step of the analysis tracks Heller’s identification of categorical exceptions to
104
105
Second Amendment scrutiny : felons and the mentally ill, sensitive

96
97

98
99

100
101
102
103

104

Id. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of the
Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .”).
For a more in-depth examination of the developing Second Amendment doctrine in the
lower federal courts, see Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the
Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 725–56 (2012).
651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011).
See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives,
2012 WL 5259015, at *6–9 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510,
518 (6th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.org v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir.
2012); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese,
627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d.
Cir. 2010).
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701.
See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701–02 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35
(2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010)).
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702–03 (citing McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038–47). For a discussion of the
Second Amendment’s incorporation against the states, see supra notes 77–82 and
accompanying text.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27). The Third Circuit did not
include regulations on the sale of firearms amongst these exceptions, despite the fact that
the Court in Heller indicated that they were “presumptively lawful,” 554 U.S. at 627 n.26,
because if conditions on the sale of arms were protected from judicial examination, then
“there would be no constitutional defect in prohibiting the commercial sale of firearms,”
a result “untenable under Heller.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 n.8.
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107

If the restricted activity
places, and dangerous and unusual weapons.
falls outside the scope of the right (for example, falling within one of the
categorical exceptions), then the “activity is categorically unprotected, and
108
the law is not subject to further Second Amendment review.”
If the law passes the threshold inquiry, either because there is
insufficient historical evidence for a categorical exception or because there
is no other kind of exception, then the court, pursuant to the Seventh
109
Circuit’s framework, applies a means-ends analysis.
Modeled after First
Amendment jurisprudence, the level of heightened scrutiny to be employed
depends upon “how close the law comes to the core of the Second

105

106

107

108

109

The Third Circuit suggested that these two exceptions could be part of a category of
“presumptively dangerous individuals,” such as substance abusers, who fall outside of the
protection of the Second Amendment. Id. at 92–93. Undocumented immigrants and
persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence could also be added to a
potential category of individuals who have committed certain illegal acts. See United
States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 24–26 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that individuals convicted of
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence “fit[] comfortably among” Heller’s categorical
exclusions); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding
that “the phrase ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment of the Constitution does not
include aliens illegally in the United States”); United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437CR-GRAHAM/TORRES, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84633, at *21–22 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008)
(finding that undocumented immigrants are not entitled to the protection of the Second
Amendment due to their lack of membership in the “political community”). But see
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding a lack of sufficient
evidence to support a finding that a misdemeanant convicted of domestic violence fell
outside the scope of protection of the Second Amendment and therefore setting
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard). One court has found that lawful
permanent resident aliens, in contrast, “are among ‘the people’” whose right to bear
arms the Second Amendment protects. Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 288, 301
(D. Mass. 2012).
Some courts have declined to identify certain locations as “sensitive” given that the
Supreme Court did not give guidance as to why a certain place might be “sensitive.” See
GeorgiaCarry.org v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1316–17, 1319 (M.D. Ga. 2011)
(declining to classify a “place of worship” as a “sensitive place” but still finding that a law
prohibiting the possession of firearms in places of worship passes intermediate scrutiny),
aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).
Included among these are short-barreled shotguns, Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (citing United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)), and machine guns, United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d
868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008).
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702–03. The threshold “scope” inquiry is modeled after the Court’s freespeech jurisprudence under the First Amendment. See id. at 702; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at
89 n.4 (noting that “Heller itself repeatedly invokes the First Amendment in establishing
principles governing the Second Amendment”). For an in-depth comparison of the
doctrines of the First and Second Amendments, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and
Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 401–04, 413–14,
416 (2009). For a longer discussion of Heller’s categorical exclusions, see Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts and the New Right
to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1247–60 (2009).
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703.
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Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”
Thus, “broadly prohibitory” laws, such as those in Heller and McDonald that
banned handgun possession in the home, are “categorically
unconstitutional,” whereas less restrictive laws can be subject to varying
111
degrees of scrutiny.
Other courts have taken somewhat different approaches to Second
Amendment claims. The First Circuit analyzes laws both by comparing the
laws to the categorical exclusions and by subjecting the laws to means-ends
112
scrutiny.
The Ninth Circuit in Nordyke at first required that laws pass a
“substantial burden” threshold test before receiving heightened scrutiny, but
113
refused to identify which form of heightened scrutiny would apply. Upon
rehearing en banc, however, the majority did not articulate a Second
Amendment test because a change in the case’s underlying facts did not
114
require it.
Another alternative approach proposed by one scholar is to
confine Second Amendment protection exclusively to possession in the
115
home, “subject to nearly plenary restriction” elsewhere.
A variety of other questions have been posited by commentators in the
wake of Heller yet remain untested by litigation. One commentator has
116
questioned the validity of laws that prohibit firearms in public housing.
Another has argued that bans on firearms in the residence halls of public
117
colleges and universities should withstand constitutional scrutiny.

110
111

112
113
114

115

116

117

Id. at 703.
Id. For example, if the law imposes a “severe burden on the core Second Amendment
right of armed self-defense,” then the government must demonstrate “an extremely
strong public-interest justification and a close fit between the government’s means and its
end.” Id. at 708. However, if the law regulates “activity lying closer to the margins” of the
scope of the right, then “modest burdens on the right may be more easily justified.” Id.
United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011).
Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2011).
Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Should the County add new
requirements or enforce the ordinance unequally, or should additional facts come to
light, Plaintiffs or others similarly situated may, of course, bring a new Second
Amendment challenge to the relevant laws or practices. But in the present case, they
cannot succeed, no matter what form of scrutiny applies to Second Amendment
claims.”). In his concurring opinion joined by three other judges, Judge O’Scannlain
stated that he “would expressly adopt the measured, calibrated approach developed in
the original three-judge panel majority opinion.” Id. at 1045–46.
See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1280 (2009) (proposing that the Second Amendment be treated as
protecting “a robust right to possess [a firearm] in the home, subject to nearly plenary
restriction by elected government officials everywhere else.” (footnotes omitted)).
See Jamie L. Wershbale, The Second Amendment Under a Government Landlord: Is There a
Right to Keep and Bear Legal Firearms in Public Housing?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 995, 996–97
(2010).
See Joan H. Miller, Comment, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
235, 238 (2011).
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Professor Blocher has raised the question of whether “the Second
Amendment’s guarantee of an individual right to keep or bear arms in self118
defense should include the freedom not to keep or bear them at all.” The
extent to which corporations possess rights under the Second Amendment,
119
a question posed by Professor Miller, may also weigh into a court’s
consideration of an HOA ban on handguns, especially since HOAs are often
organized as non-profit corporations. The answers to all of these questions,
together with the contours of the Second Amendment doctrine as currently
being developed by the lower federal courts, could bear on the policy
analysis of a court confronted with a challenge to an HOA servitude banning
handgun possession in the home.

C. State Constitutional Law and the Right to Bear Arms
Another piece to the puzzle of the right to bear arms is the status of this
right under state constitutions and in state courts. Of the fifty states, six do
not have any kind of provision in their state constitutions protecting the
120
right to bear arms.
This means that forty-four states have a provision in
121
their constitutions that in some way protects the right to bear arms. About
thirty of these state provisions explicitly identify the right in terms of the
122
purpose of self-defense, while three explicitly define the right in terms of
123
“common defense.”
Five of the state constitutions, like the U.S.

118
119
120

121
122
123

See Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34, at 4.
See Miller, supra note 8, at 954–55.
These states are California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York. See
Stephen R. McAllister, Individual Rights Under a System of Dual Sovereignty: The Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 867, 881 & n.67 (2011). Notably, a proposed right to
bear arms amendment to the Iowa constitution has already been approved by the Iowa
House of Representatives but is currently stalled in the Iowa Senate. See Rod Boshart,
Gun-law changes likely stalled in the Iowa state Senate, SIOUXCITYJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 5, 2012,
5:09 PM), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/gun-law-changeslikely-stalled-in-the-iowa-state-senate/article_812868bf-8961-5762-9d93ab2621802f50.html. The proposed amendment provides that:
The right of an individual to acquire, keep, possess, transport, carry, transfer, and
use arms to defend life and liberty and for all other legitimate purposes is
fundamental and shall not be infringed upon or denied. Mandatory licensing,
registration, or special taxation as a condition of the exercise of this right is
prohibited, and any other restriction shall be subject to strict scrutiny.
H.R.J. Res. 2009, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2012), available at
http://coolice.legis.state.ia.us/linc/84/external/HJR2009_Reprinted.pdf.
See McAllister, supra note 120.
See id. at 881 & n.68. The proposed right to bear arms amendment to the Iowa
constitution does contain self-defense language. See H.R.J. Res. 2009, supra note 120.
These states are Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Tennessee. See McAllister, supra note 120,
at 881 & n.69.
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Constitution, have language in the provision relating to a militia, and six
125
do not specify any purpose for the right.
Naturally, state courts play a central role in interpreting these provisions.
A major question before state courts now that the Second Amendment has
been incorporated against the states is how, if at all, state courts will
continue to interpret their own state constitutional right to bear arms
provisions.
It is a fundamental principle that state supreme courts are the final
126
arbiters of state constitutional law.
While the predominant trend of state
courts today is to interpret state constitutional law “in lockstep” with federal
127
constitutional law,
state courts still have the authority to exercise
128
interpretive independence.
What this means for the right to bear arms is
that a state might interpret its constitution to allow more government
restrictions on the right to bear arms than the Second Amendment allows.
In the context of constitutional law, of course, the state’s higher tolerance
for firearm regulation will have little practical import because federal law, by
providing a higher “floor” of constitutional protection, will preempt state
129
law.
124
125
126

127

128

129

These states are Alaska, Hawaii, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. See id. at
881 & n.64
These states are Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, and Rhode Island. See id. at
881 & n.70.
See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323,
334 (2011) [hereinafter Blocher, Reverse Incorporation] (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 120–21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Each State has power to impose higher
standards governing police practices under state law than is required by the Federal
Constitution.”); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New
Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 100 (2000) (“State supreme courts have
the unquestioned, final authority to interpret their state constitutions.”).
See id. at 339 (citing Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State
Constitutions, and Judicial Policymaking, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 37, 47 (1992); Robert K. Fitzpatrick,
Note, Neither Icarus nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an Independent Source of Individual
Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1850 (2004); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker,
Federalism, Liberty and State Constitutional Law, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1457, 1467 (1997)).
For a brief historical overview of the changing dynamics between the federal and state
constitutions, see Blocher, Reverse Incorporation, supra note 126, at 329–33.
See Blocher, Reverse Incorporation, supra note 126, at 334 (citing James A. Gardner, State
Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State
Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1030 (2003)). In principle, a state court can interpret a
state constitutional provision differently than a federal constitutional provision “even if
the two are identically worded and even though the state itself cannot violate the federal
standard.” Id. at 332 (citing Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law,
65 TEMP. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1992)).
See McAllister, supra note 120, at 876 (“[A] state constitutional interpretation giving lesser
rights than the U.S. Constitution cannot have legal effect so long as the federal
constitutional ‘floor’ remains in effect.” (citing Dorothy Toth Beasley, Essay, Federalism
and the Protection of Individual Rights: The American State Constitutional Perspective, 11 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 681, 695–96 (1995))).

1022

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:3

But a significant practical difference might exist when a state court
conducts a public policy analysis under the law of servitudes. The state
130
constitution has been declared the highest source of a state’s public policy,
and so a state court conducting a public policy analysis of an HOA ban on
handguns may give more weight to the policy evinced by the state right to
bear arms provision than to the policy evinced by the federal Second
Amendment. Furthermore, if the policy evinced by a state right to bear
arms provision conflicts with the policy evinced by the Second Amendment,
the state policy might trump the federal policy in the analysis, given the
weight accorded to state constitutions in public policy analysis.
Thus, even where federal law might preempt state law in the context of a
constitutional claim, state law has the potential to be more influential than
federal law in the context of a public policy analysis under the law of
servitudes. For example, in 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court in Kalodimos
upheld a ban on handguns as constitutional under the Illinois Constitution’s
right to bear arms provision because the law prohibited only one “discrete
131
categor[y]” of firearms.
While this handgun prohibition obviously would
132
be struck down as unconstitutional under Heller and McDonald, the Illinois
courts today have not explicitly overruled Kalodimos when confronted with
right to bear arms claims. Illinois appellate courts have recognized that
under Kalodimos, the Illinois right to bear arms provision may provide less
protection than the Second Amendment, suggesting that Kalodimos could be
133
invalidated.
Yet the courts have relied only upon the federal Second

130

131
132

133

See, e.g., Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 17 (N.J. 1992) (“[T]his
Court is not likely to perceive the state’s highest source of public policy, namely, its
constitution, as irrelevant.”); Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d
917, 924 (Pa. 1989) (Zappala, J., concurring) (“No more clear statement of public policy
exists than that of a constitutional amendment.”)
Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 272–73 (1984).
See David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1120–21 (2010) (giving various reasons why
this law would be unconstitutional under Heller and McDonald). Before Heller, many state
courts analyzed claims of infringements of the right to bear arms under a “reasonable
regulation” standard, which, while not as lenient as rational basis review, asked simply
“whether a law effectively destroys or nullifies the ability of law-abiding people to possess
firearms for self-defense.” See Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, The Standardless Second
Amendment,
AM.
CONST.
SOC.,
Oct.
2010,
at
6,
available
at
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Mehr%20and%20Winkler%20Standardless%20Second%20
Amendment.pdf (explaining the “reasonable regulation” standard). But see Kopel &
Cramer, supra at 1119 (pointing out that some state courts had used other kinds of tests).
See People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“We agree with defendant
that in light of the holdings in Heller and McDonald, Kalodimos’ interpretation of [the
Illinois right to bear arms provision] appears to provide less protection than does the
second amendment.”). Accord People v. Robinson, 964 N.E.2d 551, 556–57 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011) (finding “no reason to depart from Aguilar in this case”). But see People v. Mimes,
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Amendment in adjudicating claims and have refused to rule upon Kalodimos
on the grounds that only the Supreme Court of Illinois would have the
134
One Illinois appellate court faced with the issue stated
power to do so.
that McDonald made it unnecessary even to address the Illinois right to bear
135
arms again.
Yet the Illinois right to bear arms is not necessarily irrelevant and may
continue to exert an influence in Illinois courts as long as Kalodimos is not
overruled. As the doctrine in Illinois now stands, the Illinois right to bear
arms, as interpreted in Kalodimos, exhibits a higher degree of tolerance for
136
firearm regulation than does the federal Second Amendment.
And
although the Second Amendment preempts the Illinois provision in the
context of a constitutional claim, the Illinois provision might nevertheless
exert a stronger influence in the context of a public policy analysis under
the law of servitudes.
The policy underlying state constitutional law therefore can play an
independent and significant role in a court’s determination of the validity of

134

135

136

953 N.E.2d 55, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“We note, however, that the analysis and holding
in Kalodimos have been impliedly overruled by Heller and McDonald.”).
See Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d at 828 (“[O]nly our supreme court may change its
holding . . . Accordingly, we must decline defendant’s invitation to ‘revisit’ Kalodimos.”
(citations omitted)). Accord People v. Williams, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
(“Any reexamination of Kalodimos would be the task of the Illinois Supreme Court.”);
People v. Montyce H., 959 N.E.2d 221, 229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“[E]ven if [Kalodimos]
should be revisited in light of Heller and McDonald, ‘only our [Illinois] supreme court may
change its [own] holding.’” (internal citation omitted)). The Supreme Court of Illinois
has not ruled upon this question.
Williams, 962 N.E.2d at 1151 (“[I]n light of the application of the second amendment to
the states by McDonald, there is no need to resort to constructions of the Illinois
Constitution’s provision applicable to the right to bear arms.”).
The Colorado courts, in contrast, have exhibited a lower degree of tolerance for firearm
restrictions, both before and after Heller. See Eugene Volokh, Colorado Courts Continue to
Protect Felons’ Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:55
PM), http://volokh.com/2012/03/01/colorado-courts-continue-to-protect-felons-rightsto-keep-and-bear-arms [hereinafter Volokh, Felons’ Rights to Keep and Bear Arms] (citing
State v. Carbajal, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 303 (Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2012)); Eugene
Volokh, Felons’ Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Colorado, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sep. 16,
2011, 6:41 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/09/16/felons-right-to-keep-and-bear-arms-incolorado (citing People v. DeWitt, 2011 Colo. App. LEXIS 1523 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011)).
Each of these cases reaffirmed a prior Colorado Supreme Court decision that permitted
felons charged with a felony firearm possession to raise the affirmative defense that the
felon possessed the firearm for the purpose of defense of home, person, and property.
See People v. Ford, 568 P.2d 26, 28 (Colo. 1977). Although Professor Volokh notes that
“felons in Colorado get only limited benefit from this ruling, because they are still
generally barred by federal law from possessing a gun, and the Colorado Constitution
doesn’t affect the application of that federal law,” this divergence from federal law
nevertheless evinces a distinct state constitutional policy that could weigh into a public
policy analysis. Volokh, Felons’ Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Colorado, supra.
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an HOA ban on handguns, in which case the federal policy emanating from
Heller may not have the last say in a court’s adjudication.

III. VALIDITY OF HOA SERVITUDES THAT PROHIBIT HANDGUN
POSSESSION IN THE HOME
A. HOA Handgun Bans and the State Action Doctrine
An HOA ban on handgun possession could implicate the right to bear
arms, but because HOAs are organizations formed by private agreement, a
court would very likely not subject an HOA servitude to constitutional
137
scrutiny.
Under rare circumstances, however, a plaintiff might be able to
bring a constitutional claim against an HOA.
If the HOA governs a community that is a company town or that at least
approximates a municipality by “performing the full spectrum of municipal
138
powers and st[anding] in the shoes of the State,” the HOA might be
deemed a state actor under Marsh and thus subject to the federal or state
139
constitution. The California Court of Appeal, however, has indicated that
Marsh is a high hurdle to clear:
[A] homeowners association is not a quasi-municipality. It does not
perform most of the functions of a municipality (such as providing police
and fire services, schools, libraries and utility services), and those limited
functions it performs that resemble municipal functions (levying
assessments, maintaining common areas, enforcing rules) are also
performed by entities (such as corporations or private recreational clubs)
that are not governmental entities. Moreover, a municipality enjoys
140
privileges and immunities not available to a homeowners association.

One commentator put a spin on Marsh by positing that the state action
doctrine could apply where consumer choice in housing is severely limited
141
to HOA-governed developments.
The potential for this state of affairs is
found in the increasing prevalence of HOA-governed developments and of
zoning regulations that effectively mandate that new homes be built in
142
HOA-governed developments. If all of the HOAs in a given area ban some
kind of constitutional right, leaving an individual with no reasonable

137

138
139
140
141
142

RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, § 6, at intro. note (“[A]bsent other circumstances, the
associations’ actions are not state action sufficient to subject them to challenge under the
United States Constitution . . . .”).
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972). See also supra Part I.B.1.
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Sher v. San Diegueno Hills Homeowners Ass’n, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2960, at
*16 (Apr. 11, 2006).
See Chadderdon, supra note 33, at 239–40.
Id.
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residential option that would allow the exercise of such right, then a
143
constitutional challenge could arise under the state action doctrine.
Another vehicle for application of the state action doctrine to an HOA
ban on handgun possession is through Shelley, although this doctrinal
144
passage is extremely narrow. At least one court has rejected the argument
145
that Shelley could subject an HOA to constitutional standards,
and
although Shelley has been applied in the context of HOAs’ infringement of
146
First Amendment rights, most judges and academics have concluded that
147
the state-action rule in Shelley should not be used to adjudicate disputes.
Thus, it is unlikely that a court would expand the reasoning of Shelley to find
that a court’s enforcement of a servitude banning possession of handguns in
the home violates the Second Amendment.
In the rare event that state action is found, an HOA ban on handgun
possession in the home would be unconstitutional. Just like the laws
invalidated in Heller and McDonald, the ban would eradicate the core of the
Second Amendment right: self-defense in the home with a handgun. But in
the likely absence of state action, an HOA handgun ban would be better
challenged as a violation of public policy under the law of servitudes.

B. HOA Handgun Bans Under the Law of Servitudes
It is quite possible that an HOA ban on handgun possession in the home
148
would be valid under property law.
First, the servitude is subject to a
presumption of validity, as all servitudes are. Second, it is possible that a
court would find that the servitude does not violate public policy because
the servitude does not unreasonably burden the fundamental constitutional
right to keep and bear arms: a balancing of the interests and public policies
implicated by the servitude, including federal and state constitutional law
policy and property law policy, would indicate that the benefits of enforcing
the servitude far outweigh the risks of societal harm posed by the servitude.
Yet given the flexibility of the public policy analysis, it is also possible that a
court would find that the servitude is an unreasonable burden on the
fundamental right to bear arms, and thus invalid. If this issue were litigated
in state courts, the likely result would be a patchwork of decisions (some
upholding the servitudes, some invalidating them) that vary by state and
possibly by region.
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See Hutton v. Shamrock Ridge Homeowners Ass’n, No. 3:09-CV-1413-O, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115953, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009).
See supra note 44.
See supra note 45.
For an explanation of the reasonableness test for servitudes, see supra Part I.B.2.
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1. Federal Constitutional Law Policy
While constitutional law is useful to a public policy analysis, especially an
analysis that concerns a fundamental constitutional right, it does not control
the analysis. The most obvious federal constitutional policy against an HOA
149
ban on handgun possession in the home is Heller. Heller’s definition of the
core of the Second Amendment right as self-defense of the home with a
150
handgun certainly evinces a public policy disfavoring a ban on handgun
possession in the home. The core of the Second Amendment right, as
defined by Heller, and the fundamental nature of the right, as determined by
McDonald, might be sufficient for a court to declare an HOA ban on
handguns invalid, especially if the state right to bear arms has been
interpreted in “lockstep” with the Second Amendment or if the court is
inherently biased toward gun rights.
Yet a more nuanced approach to the Second Amendment might dull the
perceived severity of an HOA’s infringement upon this right. As an initial
consideration, the Second Amendment is applicable to federal government
action through Heller and to state and local government action through
McDonald, but not to private action; to this extent the Second Amendment
evinces a policy to protect individuals from government impositions on their
right to bear arms but to remain neutral with regard to voluntary restrictive
agreements between private individuals.
Additionally, the federal courts of appeals employ a means-end analysis
151
when adjudicating Second Amendment claims. This inquiry is concerned
in part with how restrictive a regulation is on the right to bear arms. Heller
and McDonald, by invalidating handgun bans that covered an entire city,
suggest
that
“broadly
prohibitory”
laws
are
“categorically
152
unconstitutional.”
The Seventh Circuit in Ezell, guided by this reasoning,
entered a preliminary injunction against a law banning all firing ranges
153
within a city. Yet while a law that bans handgun possession in all homes in
a city is unconstitutionally broad, an HOA servitude prohibiting handgun
possession in a specific tract of homes within a city is nowhere near as broad:
the law extends throughout the entirety of a jurisdiction, but the servitude is
149

150
151
152
153

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (finding that a law that
banned handgun possession in the home was unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights”).
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (summarizing the holding in Heller).
See supra Part II.B (describing how the lower federal courts use a means-end analysis
derived from the majority opinion in Heller).
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (2011).
Id. at 710 (“Perhaps the City can muster sufficient evidence to justify banning firing
ranges everywhere in the city, though that seems quite unlikely. As the record comes to
us at this stage of the proceedings, the firing-range ban is wholly out of proportion to the
public interests the City claims it serves.”).
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enforceable only against action occurring on properties that are subject to
the HOA. If a homeowner does not wish to live in a neighborhood that bans
handguns, then the homeowner can pack up and move to a more agreeable
154
neighborhood without necessarily having to leave the jurisdiction.
Moreover, property law policy favors servitudes that cover no more than a
155
reasonable amount of land area. So while Second Amendment policy may
disfavor broad restrictions on the right to bear arms, such as a law banning
handgun possession throughout an entire city, a court might view an HOA
servitude banning handgun possession in just one residential development
as hardly an unreasonable burden.
Although the Seventh Circuit in Ezell ruled that it is a “profoundly
mistaken assumption” that “the harm to a constitutional right is measured by
the extent to which it can be exercised in another jurisdiction,” this
principle may not apply in a public policy challenge to an HOA handgun
156
restriction.
A court might simply decide that this is a principle of
constitutional law, which does not control in a public policy analysis. A
court might even recognize that property law policies cut the other way by
lending deference to servitudes that prospective homeowners can
reasonably avoid. An HOA ban on handgun possession in the home still
leaves reasonable alternatives to individuals who wish to own firearms. In
addition to moving out of the HOA-governed community, under a strict
reading of a servitude banning handgun possession, an individual can keep
a firearm other than a handgun at home. An individual who still wishes to
own a handgun can store it in an off-site storage unit, at a firing range, or at
another residence. If a family is concerned for its self-defense, the family
can rely on the HOA’s security personnel (gated communities, for example,
often have guards at the entrance), their home-security system, other
157
weapons of self-defense, or the police. A court could conclude that if
none of these reasonable alternatives is agreeable to a homeowner
challenging the handgun ban, then the homeowner should not have
purchased a home in the HOA. A court thus could decide not to disrupt the
154

155

156
157

A homeowner can therefore “vote with his feet” amongst various HOAs (or
neighborhoods not governed by HOAs) in the same way that homeowners vote with their
feet amongst municipalities. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64
J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that
community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.”).
See RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing how the
“geographical scope of a private party’s power to impose servitudes on an unwilling
purchaser” should be considered).
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 697 (analogizing to First Amendment jurisprudence).
For a discussion of non-lethal self-defense in the context of the right to keep and bear
arms, see Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the
Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199 (2009) (arguing that
non-lethal weapons bans may interfere with certain constitutionally protected rights).
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expectation interests of the other HOA members or undermine the other
valuable public policy considerations of the HOA ban by vindicating the
home purchaser who willfully puts himself in a dissenting position.
Another relevant dimension to the Second Amendment, suggested
recently by the Eleventh Circuit, is that the Second Amendment must be
interpreted in harmony with private property rights. In GeorgiaCarry.Org v.
Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a state law that
prohibited the carrying of firearms in places of worship without the
158
permission of the owner of the place of worship. In so holding, the Court
rejected the proposition “that the Second Amendment in any way abrogated
the well established property law, tort law, and criminal law that embodies a
159
private property owner’s exclusive right to be king of his own castle.”
Thus, if an individual owner of private property has the right to exclude
firearms from the property because the right to bear arms “must be limited
by the equally fundamental right of a private property owner to exercise
160
exclusive dominion and control over its land,” then it arguably should
follow that a group of owners of private property organized as an HOA also
should have the right to exclude firearms, including handguns, from the
HOA properties.
Answers to certain unresolved questions may suggest that Second
Amendment policy favors an HOA ban on handgun possession in the home.
For instance, if the Second Amendment contains a right not to keep or bear
161
arms, then this policy strongly favors the collective action of homeowners
to agree by contract to keep firearms, handguns included, out of their
neighborhoods. Also, if prohibitions on handgun possession in public
162
163
housing or college dormitories withstand constitutional scrutiny, then
such a ruling would evince a Second Amendment policy to consider the
particular nature of the community or residence affected by the ban. A
private community of individuals voluntarily agreeing to restrict their right
to possess a handgun at home could be favored by such a policy.

158
159
160

161
162
163

687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1265. A right to exclude guns from one’s private property is tied to the broader
question of whether there exists a right not to keep or bear arms. See Blocher, Right Not
To, supra note 34, at 4 (proposing that “the Second Amendment’s guarantee of an
individual right to keep or bear arms in self-defense should include the freedom not to
keep or bear them at all”).
See Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34.
See Wershbale, supra note 116 (exploring the Second Amendment in the context of
public housing).
See Miller, supra note 117 (claiming that McDonald grants universities the constitutional
permission to prohibit firearms on campus).
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Finally, if corporations have Second Amendment rights, then the many
HOAs that are organized as not-for-profit corporations could possess Second
Amendment rights. The recognition of the right to bear arms in HOAs
themselves could be irrelevant if the HOA ban on handguns targets only
individual homeowners, and not the HOA as a distinct entity. But
recognition of the right in HOAs could also complicate the analysis if an
HOA handgun ban targets the HOA itself. For example, such a ban might
prevent the HOA from employing armed security guards. Disarming the
HOA in this manner could undermine the justification for disarming
individual residents, since residents reasonably could want security guard
protection in exchange for the residents’ agreement to be bound by the
HOA handgun ban. On the other hand, city police would remain available
to ensure residents’ safety, and so an HOA ban targeting both residents and
the HOA itself might be a reasonable burden and thus valid.

2. State Constitutional Law Policy
Like federal constitutional law, state constitutional law does not control a
public policy analysis, but unlike the federal constitution, the state
constitution is the most important source of public policy that can be
165
considered in the analysis. Some states might interpret their state right to
bear arms provisions in lockstep with federal law. For these states, the policy
evinced by the Second Amendment, as discussed above, may be equally
evinced by their own state provisions. However, some states might assert
their power to interpret their state constitutions independently of federal
law, even though the Second Amendment may preempt state constitutional
claims. If these states reach different understandings of their right to bear
arms provisions, then the state can develop more policy reasons to favor
HOA bans on handgun possession in the home.
Six states do not have any sort of state constitutional provision protecting
166
the right to bear arms, which suggests a policy of relative neutrality of the
state vis à vis HOA handgun bans. Moreover, there are five states whose
167
provisions contain clauses relating to a militia purpose for the right.
Although the Court in Heller did not read the Second Amendment’s Militia
Clause as limiting the purpose of the right to bear arms, a state court, relying
164
165
166

167

See Miller, supra note 8 (analyzing Second Amendment rights in the context of the
corporate form after McDonald and Citizens United v. FEC).
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
These states are California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York. See
McAllister, supra note 120, at 881 & n.67; see also supra note 120 (describing the recently
proposed right to bear arms amendment to the Iowa constitution).
These states are Alaska, Hawaii, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. See
McAllister, supra note 120, at 881 n.64.
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on legal considerations particular to its own state constitution, might read its
own clause as imposing such a limitation or might disagree with the
168
This
interpretation of the Second Amendment’s Militia Clause in Heller.
reading could suggest that the policy of the right to bear arms is to promote
militia service, which would not be harmed by an HOA’s ban on handguns.
Three other states explicitly define the right to bear arms as for the purpose
169
of “common defense.” This collectivist approach suggests a policy more in
line with a militia-purpose approach, and to that extent public policy is not
threatened by an HOA ban, since militias need not necessarily store their
arms in homes.
Nevertheless, a large remainder of the states have right to bear arms
provisions much more similar to the Second Amendment. As previously
mentioned, if these states interpret their state provisions in lockstep with the
Second Amendment, then this parallel could weigh in favor of invalidating
an HOA ban on handguns.
The legal standards that states apply to alleged infringements of state
right to bear arms provisions also weigh into the analysis. Most states
traditionally employed the “reasonable regulation” standard, which is
170
concerned only with absolute infringement of the right to bear arms. This
standard reveals a policy of tolerance towards all but the most excessive of
prohibitions. Since an HOA ban on handguns would ban only handguns,
and only on properties subject to the HOA, the ban would likely be
consonant with these states’ constitutional policies. And while Heller might
lead some state courts to adopt a more restrictive legal standard for a state
right to bear arms, the current position of the Illinois appellate courts
suggests that state courts may pursue adjudication of Second Amendment
claims alone, and thus either leave state right to bear arms doctrines frozen
171
in pre-Heller condition or develop the doctrines independently. The
Colorado courts, on the other hand, have interpreted their state right to
172
bear arms as even more protective than the Second Amendment, which

168

169
170
171
172

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment: Why Heller
is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 174–78 (2008)
(suggesting that the Court in Heller misapplied the Militia Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution when interpreting the Second Amendment).
These states are Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Tennessee. See McAllister, supra note 120,
at 881 & n.69.
See Mehr & Winkler, supra note 132.
See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text (explaining how Illinois state courts have
refused to change the state right to bear arms doctrine in spite of Heller and McDonald).
See supra note 136 (describing how the Colorado state courts have recognized a felon’s
affirmative defense under the state right to bear arms provision that likely would not be
recognized under the Second Amendment).
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evinces a policy that would exhibit less tolerance for an HOA ban on
handguns.
State courts may interpret their state constitutions in still other distinct
ways. For example, Heller and McDonald asserted that the handgun was the
“quintessential” self-defense weapon, but what if a rural state considered the
173
In
rifle or the shotgun to be the “quintessential” self-defense weapon?
such a case, a state court might not consider an HOA ban on handgun
possession to be a violation of public policy, even though an HOA ban on
rifle possession would be.

3. Property Law Policy
A variety of property law policies weigh in favor of enforcing an HOA
174
ban on handgun possession. The primary justification for imposing such a
175
servitude most likely is safety : the keeping of guns in the home has been
176
177
178
linked to unintentional gun injuries, suicide, and homicide.
One
study found that “for every time a household gun was used for self-defense,
there were 4 unintentional shootings, 7 criminal assaults or homicides, and
179
11 attempted or completed suicides.” Not surprisingly, a large majority of

173

174
175

176

177

178

179

While “a mere 20 percent of gun-owning individuals have only handguns[,] 44 percent
have both handguns and long guns, reflecting the fact that most people who have
acquired guns for self-protection are also hunters and target shooters.” Philip J. Cook et
al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 1041, 1047 (2009).
See supra Part I.B.2.
See Cook et al., supra note 173, at 1049 (“The threat of being shot prompts private citizens
and public institutions to undertake a variety of costly measures to reduce this risk, and
many people live with anxiety arising from the lingering chance that they or a loved one
could be shot.”).
Matthew Miller et al., Firearm storage practices and rates of unintentional firearms deaths in the
United States, 37 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 661, 661–67 (2005) (finding an
increased risk of unintentional firearm death in states where gun owners were more likely
to store loaded guns and an even higher risk in states where the loaded guns were more
likely to be unlocked).
Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership, 327 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 467, 470 (1992) (finding that the risk of suicide is five times greater in homes with
guns and two times greater in homes with handguns than in homes with long guns only).
Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home, 329
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1084, 1087 (1993) (finding that individuals who keep firearms at home
are about three times more likely to be murdered and about eight times more likely to be
murdered by a family member or intimate acquaintance).
Studies
and
Reports,
BRADY
CAMPAIGN
TO
PREVENT
GUN
VIOLENCE,
http://www.bradycampaign.org/studies/view/102 (last visited Mar. 11, 2012)
(summarizing Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the Home,
45 J. OF TRAUMA: INJURY, INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 263, 263–67 (1998)).
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180

The empirical literature on the
Americans today do not possess a gun.
181
effect of guns on safety is, however, inconclusive, and while “the statistics
182
should be largely irrelevant as a constitutional matter,” the validity of an
HOA servitude is a matter of state property law, not only constitutional law.
183
Residents’ mere belief that handgun bans lead to safer communities, even
if empirically untrue or inconclusive, implicates fundamental policies of
property law that would favor validating the ban.
First, if the ban on handguns has been in place long enough, the HOA
residents will have developed an expectation interest in the servitude, and a
court could respect the peace of mind that the servitude has brought to the
community. Moreover, if prospective purchasers of HOA homes also believe
that handgun bans increase safety, then these purchasers may be willing to
pay a safety premium on the price of the home, which in turn supports the
policies of promoting the productive use of land and of supporting
servitudes that relate to the value of the land. To the extent that prospective
184
purchasers pay less for homes that are not protected by handgun bans,
declaring an HOA handgun ban invalid as against public policy actually
undermines the public policy that favors the enhancing of home values.
A court might be suspicious of the ban because it restricts the exercise of
a fundamental right on an HOA resident’s individually owned property, but
this suspicion could be allayed by the fact that guns, even if stored on
individually owned property, produce negative externalities on the
185
neighborhood.
These spill-over effects include potential violence, even if
accidental, to neighbors visiting the home where the gun is stored as well as
180

181

182
183

184

185

See Cook et al., supra note 173, at 1045 (“[A]bout 75 percent of all adults do not own any
guns.” (citing PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 12 (1996))).
Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34, at 3 n.11 (comparing Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz,
Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 150, 151–52 (1995) (concluding that victims who use a gun or other
weapon to resist crime are less likely to be harmed than those who do not resist or resist
unarmed), with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less
Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202 (2003) (arguing that shall-issue gun laws
more likely increase rather than decrease crime)).
Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34, at 3–4 (pointing out that Heller allows an individual
to make his or her own decision whether or not to own a gun).
In one national survey, respondents were asked whether, if more people in their
neighborhood began carrying guns, they would “feel more safe, the same, or less safe.”
See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 98 (2004). Sixty-two percent of
respondents said they would feel “less safe,” whereas only 12% said they would feel “more
safe.” See id.
See Cook et al., supra note 173, at 1049 (“[T]he threat of gun violence in some
neighborhoods is an important disamenity that depresses property values and economic
development.”).
See supra notes 176–79 (describing how guns in the home have been linked to
unintentional gun injuries, suicide, and homicide).
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potential violence to neighbors when the gun is removed from its home and
brought to other parts of the neighborhood. Although the data underlying
186
this belief is disputed, a court may find the data in support of the handgun
ban sufficient at least to weigh this policy concern amongst the others.
Finally, a court might give weight to the policy of freedom of contract—
that is, the fact that a homeowner voluntarily agreed to be bound by the
187
HOA’s rules when the homeowner bought his or her home.
While this
factor is case-specific and does little to answer the broader question of
whether an HOA ban on handguns is valid in principle, a court might
consider various dimensions of this policy, including whether the servitude
existed when the homeowner purchased the home or whether the servitude
was enacted after the home was purchased; whether the homeowner was
prevented from learning about the servitude or whether the homeowner
knew or should have known about the servitude; and, if the servitude was
enacted after the homeowner purchased the home, whether the procedure
188
used to enact the servitude was valid.

4. Other Sources of Public Policy
Another source of public policy upon which an opponent to an HOA
ban on handguns might rely is the fact that his or her state attorney general
(“SAG”) was among the thirty-eight SAGs that, on behalf of their respective
states, signed an amicus brief in McDonald arguing for incorporation of the
189
Second Amendment.
A court could arguably interpret this action as the
190
state’s adoption of federal Second Amendment policy.
However, a court
might view the signing of an amicus brief as a poor indicator of public policy
when compared to the traditional sources of public policy, since the state

186
187
188
189

190

See supra note 181 and accompanying text (showing the disagreement over whether gun
safety laws are effective).
See RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1 cmt. i.
See id.
See Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). Thirty-one states did so in Heller.
See Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290).
The plurality in McDonald considered the states’ amicus brief in its reasoning. See
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3049 (citing the brief as evidence of a “popular consensus” that
the right to bear arms is fundamental). But see Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism
and the State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 108, 112 (2008) [hereinafter Blocher,
Popular Constitutionalism] (“[I]ncorporation is extremely difficult to justify on the
federalism grounds [the SAGs] invoked.”). Obviously McDonald was not a case that
involved a public policy analysis, but courts do consider state amicus briefs in deciding
cases. See Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of Federalism
Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355 (2012) (discussing the role of state amicus briefs in cases
involving issues of federalism).
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and federal constitutions, state legislation, and state court judicial decisions
all bear the imprimatur of the democratic will of the people or, in the case
of judicial decisions, the neutrality of a judge. While the actions of most
191
SAGs are, like legislation and constitutions, politically influenced, the
people of a state are not nearly as involved in government attorneys’
decisionmaking.
Moreover, government attorneys are not impartial
decisionmakers like judges, but rather are partial advocates entrusted with
192
protection of state government in legal disputes. Even assuming that SAG
action is an appropriate source of public policy, an SAG’s signing of the
amicus brief in McDonald may nevertheless have only marginal effect on the
analysis, since “all the states that signed the McDonald amicus brief (and all
but a handful of the states that did not) already guarantee an ‘individual’
right to keep and bear arms in their own constitutions, often in terms more
193
expansive than those of the Second Amendment.”
One rare but emerging source of public policy that strongly disfavors, if
not invalidates, HOA bans on handgun possession are local laws that require
194
all residents to possess handguns at home.
The constitutionality of these
195
laws is open to question, but it seems likely that an HOA servitude
prohibiting handgun possession in the home would violate these laws and
thus be invalid as illegal and not merely in violation of public policy.
A final consideration is that a court may be biased toward gun rights and
invalidate the HOA handgun ban, notwithstanding the servitude’s
presumption of validity and the federal constitutional, state constitutional,

191

192
193
194

195

Forty-three states elect their SAGs by popular vote. See About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS
GEN., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). Additionally,
“many [SAGs] go on to seek other elected offices, so they have strong incentives to be
seen as representing the will of the people.” Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note
190, at 110.
See, e.g., Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 190, at 111 (pointing out that SAGs
are advocates for their states).
Id. at 111 (citing Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 191 (2006)).
These laws have been passed in Kennesaw, Georgia; Greenleaf, Idaho; Geuda Springs,
Kansas; and Virgin, Utah. See Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34 at 37–38 (citing Anna
Fifield, Kennesaw, where everyone is armed by law, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/5c1b6a72-c5eb-11df-b53e00144feab49a.html#axzz16d4dQ5T3; Glenn Reynolds, A Rifle in Every Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2007, at A21; Kansas community requires households to have guns, USA TODAY (Nov. 23,
2003), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-11-23-kansas-guns_x.htm; Town in
Utah Requires Owning Guns, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 1994), http://abcnews.go.com/
US/story?id=95092&page=1).
See Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34, at 37–40 (addressing the constitutionality of
mandatory possession laws in the context of a posited “right not to keep or bear arms”).

Jan. 2013]

KEEPING HELLER OUT OF THE HOME

1035

196

Given that public policy
and property law policies favoring the servitude.
analysis is, by its nature, a flexible exercise of judicial decision making,
judges might exercise their discretion in a manner that withstands appeal.
Furthermore, given the political susceptibility of a judiciary comprised of
197
elected judges, a state court that once validated an HOA handgun ban
may, in a different political climate, invalidate the ban, especially if the
state’s supreme court has not yet ruled on the issue.

IV. A PATCHWORK APPROACH TO THE VALIDITY OF HOA HANDGUN
BANS
A court will validate an HOA servitude that prohibits handgun
possession in the home as long as a public policy analysis indicates that the
servitude does not unreasonably burden the right to keep and bear arms.
The policy behind the Second Amendment articulated by Heller can be
construed to strongly disfavor such a servitude, and a court may have the
discretion to invalidate the servitude based on this policy alone. A court may
be so inclined especially if the state’s courts interpret the state right to bear
arms provision in lockstep with the Second Amendment. Other states,
however, have traditionally been skeptical of extensive gun rights, exhibiting
198
a high degree of tolerance for firearm regulation.
The incorporation of
the Second Amendment against these states infringes considerably upon
their ability to effectuate their state’s traditional policy on the right to bear
arms, especially due to federal preemption of state right to bear arms claims.
Property law and state constitutional law, however, provide a venue for
both individual citizens and states to manifest their opposition to federal
Second Amendment policy. State courts have the power to interpret their
constitutions without regard to any consideration of federal constitutional
law. State courts therefore are free to interpret their own right to bear arms
policies in a manner inconsistent with, or even contrary to, federal Second
Amendment policy, and thereby validate HOA servitudes that ban handgun

196

197

198

See Jamal Greene, Guns, Originalism, and Cultural Cognition, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 511, 518
(2010) (suggesting that “our cultural orientations will cause us to resist historical or social
facts that point towards a competing risk assessment”).
See generally Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1411 (2001) (discussing positive aspects of political party involvement in judicial
elections). Cf. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html (reporting on
Iowa voters’ ouster of three Iowa Supreme Court justices who ruled in the unanimous
decision recognizing same-sex marriage in Iowa).
For a comparison of the states’ tolerances of gun control, see Brady 2011 State Scorecards,
BRADY
CAMPAIGN
TO
PREVENT
VIOLENCE,
http://www.bradycampaign.org/
stategunlaws/scorecard (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
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possession in the home. The tables thus can be turned against conservative
voices that advocate both states’ rights and gun rights.
It is therefore likely that a patchwork approach will emerge amongst the
states. While some states may invalidate an HOA handgun ban, other states
199
200
Perhaps this distinction will fall along regional lines.
More
may not.
likely, however, given the flexibility of the public policy test, even a complex
analysis based on the variable arguments identified in Part III of this
Comment could fail to predict how state courts will rule on the issue. The
normative value of such a patchwork approach is a question for another day.
It is enough at this juncture to recognize that HOA bans on handgun
possession—or invalidation of such bans by courts or by legislatures—will
allow states and citizens to order their constitutional values and build
communities in accordance with their own ideas of safety and defense.
Time will tell how far the looming penumbra of Heller will reach, but for now
the narrow slice of our legal system occupied by HOAs remains fertile soil
on which to experiment with limits on our right to keep and bear arms.

199
200

A patchwork might also emerge within a state if the issue never reaches the state court of
last resort.
Gun ownership traces geographic patterns, so perhaps the validity of HOA handgun bans
will follow suit. See Deborah Azrael, Philip J. Cook & Matthew Miller, State and Local
Prevalence of Firearms Ownership: Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 43, 58–60, Table AIV (2004) (finding that 60% of Mississippi households
keep a gun whereas 13% of Massachusetts households keep a gun); COOK & LUDWIG,
supra note 180, at 31–32, 50 (finding that residents of rural areas and small towns are
substantially more likely to be gun owners than residents of large cities).

